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PREF~CE

This transcript is the result of a tape-recorded
interview conducted by Frofess;;r IUchard D. Challener of
the Dulles Crill History Project with Senator Michael J.
Mansfield, in Washington, D. C. , on the lOth of May,

1966.
Senator Mansfield hes

ra~d

and approved the

trunscript as corrected .
This statement rer::resc11tn the nearly verbatim
record of an unrehearsed conversnt1on. The reader, therefore, should bear in mind that he is reading a text of the
spoken, rather than the written, word.
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CH."'.LLENER:

I wonder if I could begin this by asking 1f you recall

when you first oot to know Mr. Dulles?

MANSFIELD:

I really didn't get to know him until he became the

Secretary of State , and he became the Secretary of State my first year
in the Senate which was 14 years ago.

CHALLENER:

Yes . What sort of dealings did you have w1th him in

those early years?

W..ANSFIELD:

Very, close and fairly intimate C:c:alinos. Of course, we

came in contact with one another because of his poeition as Secretary
of State and my position as a member of the Pcre1gn Relations Committee.

-
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Ot:I3X

I was delegated to be one of the ' three American ddcgates to the Southeast Asia Treaty Conference,

th~

M'-'nila conference, along with the

Secretary and former Senator Aloxandc-r Smith of New Jersey . Then we
became involved 1n the question of what was at first Indochina and became the Independent

State~

based on the 19 54

~neva

aqreement. He

called on me many times for advice and counsel aa to what

s~ould

be

done in Diem's early days. For a while I was quite free with my infotmaUon and advice, but eventuelly I begun to recognize that that responslbility was not mine but his. So, we mutuolly broke off that relationship. But 1t was a good relat!on:ohip down through the years. I felt,
always, free to express my frank

opinion~

with him, and while at times

I differed with him decisively, he always took it in good faith, and I'm
sure he gave every suggent1on I

CHALLENER:

m~de

his earnest consideration.

Okay. Now, that gives me a number of leads to open

up some questions about. Could I ask you ho-..v Mr. Dulles, in genoral,
dealt with the foreign Relations Committee?

MANSFIELD:

He had
a •close relationship, especially with Senator
f

George, with whom he breakfasted at least once a week -- most of the
time, I believe, in Senator George's apa rtr.1ent, but much of the time,
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lso, in the S!!cretary of State'

rnit.ae wlls concerned , he

go~

alon

v1~h

th~

Com-

th :n v ry w ll. I think the

hi:-:: witl1 c

·~e.,

and consideration,

and I believe he got a good ce3l of cooperation o

o! the Committee.

Committee on the whole

tre~ted

a f :a .. the rest of

o!f1co.

~knowledgable,

He was a very cstutc m... n, v

very

pragmatic , but a IMn who was fitted forth- joh which he occupied and
which , I understand , he had prep3red himself for over a good many
decades .

CHALLENER:

That•s correct. Yes. Was he fully open and frank

and free in discussions wlth the Committee?

MJI.NSFIELD:

As much as he CO\lld be.

I don't think any Secretory

of State can be fully open and fully fran,{, bec.... use the job itself imposes
c rtllin inhibitions and prohibition:::. Set on the whole he wan QUite
frank . Of CO\lrse , I would aay that hew s grc tat the use of the lawyer' &
lan\jUage , and he could spin out an explan:!ticn a good deal longer than
was rwcessary , but my original the is would

till hold .

CHALLENER:

How did he react to questions?

MANSFIELD:

Good . He was knowle gable.
A
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knew the answers.
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And 1f he was in difficulty, he

W3S

pr.etty droit ut avoiding being

drawn into what he would consider to be an entrapment.

CHALLENER:

Did you work much with his &toff, ae 1t were, or more

with the Secretary himself? In other words, whtm you wanted to get
information, would it come directly from the Secretary?

M.\NSFlELDz

With the

Secret~ry

usually. He was not averse to

picking up the telephone and atking for sugQost1ona, and if I had
arquments to offer be was not averse to calling me up and explaining
hi.s point of view and on occasion come around part way to my point
of view.

CHALLENER:

Did you think, in general,

th::~t

the Senate Committ{'e

got involved sufficiently in the policy-making process?

MANSFIELD:

The Committee? No. But nome of us as individuals

--yes. Maybe too much.

CH.L\LLENER:

Why do you say "too much"?

.MANSFIELDz

Because the responsibility is not ours really, and as

- 4-
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I ttl d to indicate earlier, I thlnJc he 1 !lned
me 1n the matter of Diem

em~

nci

1 ttic bit too he vlly on

of the mov

made after taking

over 1n South Vietnam -- to such an ox!ent t • t I felt it had to be broken
off, because it wao outside the ken of r..y rc::;pcnsibllity and entirely
within the purview of the

E:-<:ccutiv~

br nch under the Con&titution.

Do you have e.ny gene:\31 recollections of Mr. Culle8'

CHALLENER:

feeling about the ettuation 1n wh twas then Indochina in, say, 1954,
at the time of the Geneva me_ting?

Only that he was very car<:>ful whon bo eent Bedell

MANSFIELD:

Smith to Genova not to

becoo~

directly involved. He .oort of etood

outside the chamber door wh1le t e nego lations w re 90ing on and gave
his, and thereby the government's, assent ns to what was being consummated there.
I do

re~ll,

for example, t

~...:gh ,

th tat the time of

the Manila Conference, which set up the 8 · TO treaty, that he came
to me when I reoched ManU from Saigon c.:::r.d scld that he and the Joint
Chie fs of Staff with one exce;>tion, Gen ral Ridgo•ay , and the chief
officers 1n the
had

~dvocated

De~rtment

of C:ate with or.e oxc ptlon , Bedell Smith,

that, in view of the stepped-up

- 5-

at!~cks

then bein9

m~de

Ad1 ~ ~

l
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on the Quemoys and the Matsus 'th3t we should bombard the China
mainland in return, 1n reta!iation.

He asked for my views, e.nd I told him that I would line
up with General Ridgway end Bedell Smith. I fdt it would bli! inadvisable.

Alexander Smith went the other way. I
views to the

Pr~sident

ask~d

him, also, to express my

and thM if any action of that sort wes contemplated

th.nt the Congress be called back in session -- or at least the leadership
be called by the President to the Whita House or to the hospital, where
he was in Denver -- before a decision was made. He said be would call
it to the President' tiJ attention.

He did, in Denvar. The President sided

with General Ridgway and Bedell Smith, and that was the end of that.
I.

CHALLENER:

In other words, in the summer of 1954 you felt that Mr.

Dulles was committed to the idea of t he bombing of the Chinese mainland 1n retaliation - - persor.ally committed?

Personally, along wit h all _th!i members of his executive
'
' .
l•
•'
I)
·~ ·
J"kt;.-...r
/,;l'-LLl..'-'- , .'\.·r.~u.. I
staff in the State Department .plus the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wlth the

MANSFIELDt

·\

exception of General Ridgway.
(

C P..Al.LENER:

And it was the Preside nt's

kept that from coming to pass?

- 6-

d~ois!on,

and others, which

.. .

~fl.ANSF I£LD:

CO!:ling

CHALLE 'ER:

It was the ?rcsiC!ent's

c. . c!

ion

hich kept it from

to pas. s .

Right , New, could yo':.l tf.ll me the e).'tent to which Mr .

D':.llles thought or felt that then::

as ur.y

c~

n:::e of saving what was

left of Indochina after the Geneva af"air?

WJ\NSF n:LD:

I don't think be

g~ve

t:.-t too

uch thought . I think hi!

accepted the dlvloion along th"' 17th para llel, He w s not in favor , I
do not believe , of the electiol".s which wera to be held w ithln two years
1n both North and South Victncm -- thiz 1:3, 1n 1c 56. Frankly, I was not

in bvor of the elections either. T :1t

m~y

have been n mistake on both

our parts , 1n view of events which hava heppon d since then. He was
committed to Ngo Dinh Diem, as I was. I thi.k that it was a wise
choice , all things considered. I deplo e the fact that since that time ,
his assaslnation has taken place, because I thin· that since then marks
th~

turning point in the worsening of the ffoirs in South Vietnam .

I have the

1mpr~s!ion ~hat

mind somewhat about the South \'ietname:;&
c tch hold . Is this correct?
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Mr. Dulles changed hie
rc~lmc

as he saw Diem

--

--Au•

AdOO
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Yes, I think b was doubtful. But, after all , Diem

MANSFIELD:

!ollo-.ved BZlo Dai. the emperor, who did not do much , and it was bec~use

of the impetus given by some of us --I hope I'm being modest

enc".lgh when I make this datcment -- in behalf of Diem that gave the

President (that is Ngo Dinh Diem)
c.Ac

th~ L"litiat!ve t.o wipe out the1f!.t.#~
Ht•A

Dt+J

¥en and to put down the cau.-Ge.iz and tho

.Hu~Het~s,

)( .

who were the

dissident elements in South Viotnem at thut time. And when these

(3.,;.L-... y,'1I.e.v-J

eleoents were put down, especi;;11!y the ~. the river
and the vice concesstoootree, 1n
as well - -

conc~ss1ona1rcs

c !J 0 l.'c''"

~~u esp~clally,

/;ii'Ots~.._· 1

but in Saigon

under Bao Dal, by the way -- from then on

Diem began to acquire a foothold which sttongthcned in the immediately
following years but which weakened somewhat in the last years of his

reion.

CHALLtNtR:

Did you ever discusa with Mr.

~ulles

the extent of the

American commitment at that tL111e? How far d.!.d he feel we should support
this government?

MANSFIELD:

That's a. hi!rd question to answer because I don't know

what his opinion was. We, of cour!le, did send in some four hundred
advisors, but I don't think we ever foresaw thG de.y when we would be

-8-

e.

~ n")(uy "i

ftt'..a

engaged in actual combat
overstatement because ,

VJ

io:th Vi

t 1

leo.~ inc;

.... n. Now that may be an

b"'ck, I

a Sur.:!e t

t whon you

scr.d in advisors you also make cont!nc.. ncy pl n •

CHALLEN!::R:

Do you think tL t he did dc:v_lc;> ths faeling that there

w s a chance of building a vub!

regime in S

th Vietnam?

]1.1ANSFIELDz

Under Diem, yc s. W ~· .out c:.-u stion.

CHALLt.·~:

One last que£ ion on this -- I'm not quit certain how

to word this --you said earlier trot you felt ho had relied a little bit

too much upon your advice and what

MANSFIELD:

yo~

had to zay. I wondor if. , •

Well, I would say my advice, among otherc. Because

I'm sure I wasn't the only or:e. But at least lis man in charve of Southeast Asian 11ffaira, a man by the name of Y.tJr.ncth Young, his Assistant
Secretary of State for tho

r ...r

East, was co:n1nv down to see me ell the

tim • And I was told by Young that he was cooing down at the direction

of Mr. Dulles. He JllZlY

r..~v~

B t I think I've explained

CHALLE :tRJ

been go!ng o!tcr ;>1 c s. I hope he waa.

t ..:lt

re_aticnsh.lp !airly well.

How did Mr. Dulles react wh_n you indicated you dic!n't
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~
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wiah to continue this?

He undot5tood because, being the lawyer he was , he

MANSFIELD:

w e eware of the implic ~ ons of the relationship. And I think it was e

new area for Dullea -- and for Mr. Young, too, I believe , although he'd
been out there but not in an official capec1ty. 1 suppose they were
looking around for advice from people who

m~y

have been there in order

to get some guidance until they got their feet fi.n.nly on the ground and
made up their minds definitely.

Did you feel that Mr. Dulles was intellectually sure-

CHAI.LtN ER:

footed on Southeast Asian

probl~ms?

1 think that Mr. Dul!es had 1--..is mind made up too often

MANSFIELD:

in advance, and once hie mind was Clade up it was not malleable or
viable. 1 think, though, as time went
with the

chan~es

0!1

he learned to shift end change

which occurred and at the time of his tragic passing

was more flexible thnn he Md been when he cams into office .

CPJU.ll::NER:

Is it implic!t 1n thic tl'..at perhaps be was too pessimicUc

in •54 at the time of Genevo.? !s thit: corre<:t?

- 10-

•

.

-

J

o .. .l

O~Jx

UANSF1£LD:

Yea . Too pcssimi ..tic and too pr'"" ::::-tic. It was aU

cl!lc · and white , but as time w nt o:t he

lx?~~n

o a

the various s

des

of 9'ey in between .

C HALLE: :E :

C ould you describe ycro.1r dco ings with him in regard

to aevoral of the 1netaoc:cs Vlhero he

wish~d

to

vt

the approval of the

Senate -- for exampl<t , in tho MUclo E-stern Doctrtr.e and tho off- bore
islends , and so forth?

MANSFIELD:

Well , on tho oif-.,hore islands, the Formosa Resolution ,

somo of us argued that we didn't want such e w1 e r eolution -- one
that could be interpreted so that a Lieu enc.n JG

or an Admiral

1n the

Seventh Fleet would have th power to tako the J.nitLative into their om
hando, and becauoe of that Dulles telked w!th Ei
to gst a firm and &t

eommitm~nt

nhowar and waa able

from him that 1f any decision was made,

it would be made by the President of th<:! United Stat s. Tr.at still holds.

In the Mid a Ea::lt Resc ution, the administration

of!ered arc olut1on which would, in effect, nul11!y to a

degr~e

both

the powers of the Congress and the President -- mo:;t especially the
rrezidency . We were able to offer sor:1c ugurnents 1n the Committee
which forcod a change in tha worc!ir:g of the reso:ut1cn and which, I

-11-
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trJnk, made it more ef!ectivo and mor(! constitutional.

CHALL£N~1:
w~y

Did you hevc ony :re .. c.-vat!ons, ycutself, about the
in which the Secretary cf St:lte would sccA to got the endorsement

of the Senate in advance,

MANSfiELD:

~

th1nga o! this sort?

Had then. Still do.

Did you discuss your re!lervat1ons at any time with
Mr. Dulles -- in general?

Not with Mr. Dulles, but l cl1e;ousaed it in the Comrnittco on several occasions. I tr.i."'lk it's a bad ptocedent . I don't
thin!: that these resolutions are necesse.ry. The President either has
or h:;un•t the powers as Conmander-in-Chief and President , or if he
hatn't, then he ought to come to the Congrens for additional powers,
but he do3sn't need the

pow~ra

which these re!lolut!ons --all of them

--have given him in any instance that I can recall,

CHAI.l.ENER:

Why do you, yourself, think that Mr. Dulles nought

the so resolutions?
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o t. t if r.yt.ung

For prot... ct!c::1,

NS ·2.0:

Conqreu would be in with tLc

.ccutiv~

Well, I'm shooting

CHAU.t.l!:Rs

c .... ~

ar~nd

.r.~

\:.>

nt wrong the

0'-.tld happ n.

lot because I kco ¥ your

time in Quite limited .

It 11 .

On this qucsti"n
o you

MAN .:IELD:

~ve

oft~

Suo:: c:itis and

too Aawan

D m,

any recollecticns abou• th_ cane ll t1c:1 o! tho .Aswan Dao?

Very vague. I'm not at ell u:c th t they're correct.

But I do recall that Secretary Dulle .. ,

wh~n

h first went to Egypt, pre-

sent... d G neral Naguib, wbo v;a£ th-n in control, with a •Uver plated

r volver --which 1 thought

W.:'lG

a very :xt:.:1o: inary thing to do, to

put 1t mildly. Then when .raguib

w~s

ovcrt•.:ovm and Nasser came in,

Nasser either said or did sor..'l.cthl."lg wb!.:. \ a ... anta11oni ..Uc to-.: rda
us I and then all of a audden

s~crctarj

Dulles ltrulOUl".Ccd that the fundi

vhlcb !le were going to advance to help ll 1 d
b forthcoming. And, on that

Aswan Dam would not

sis, th_ E9)'pt1 no turned to tho Soviet

Union, and I believe they hcve furnistcd, by far, the g!"eater amount

- 13 -
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~

c! the money needed to bring about ere ticn of that Dam , although
we h::we 1'3rtic1pated through cur a!c!

pro~r~!!l

!n the retention of some

of the statues and temples and what-not which would be lost with th
building of the Dam .

C fi'.ALI.ENER:

Well, l a eked H:at b::ocnue;e it's been said that there

wa opposition to Aswiln within the Foraign .c..e.tions Comm1ttao and
tr-'lt some SO'..xthem Sen:~•orD w;;;re upoc by tha cotton problem and

things of this nort • ••

• ~.N2P!ELC:

Well, I think it was more wiclcop;eacl than thct , as

fi;i.r as the Aswan Dam w... s co~~arnad, but v •l~n tho decision was mado,

th re was very little oppos!t!on to wl"-...-t the S crctary did .

Could ba have got tho upprc)>riotion through the
Senate, do you think , if he had decided the oppot1te course - -that
is, to go a head with it?

MANSFL':LD:

1 think it would heva be .... n nip and tuck .

Nip and

tuc~.

O'.~y.

-14-
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Fro;n where you sat, how did

r:.do...>-

~tf3X

se the relationsh.lp b

y

M/.NS

~we

Gcncr 1

Clo!le. Very cluz •

LC:

to an eY.traordinary devr o upon :P..-!r.

r

~~ty,

~~

0'1

t. n:: t

.r:d
Cul~

n

w,

•o

rand Mr. Dull .. ?

::!

?r siden d pe;-;ded
, 1n

f!ect, in

th:: Secretary o! G ate.

In other wo:ds, you r.:ally felt t:.\! Mr . Dull s callod
the

hots , made th maj r c!eci.:ior,s, and so fo:th?

That's right, I do. Without que ..Uon.

Are there any particul r incident" that stand out 1n
yO'Jr relationship, your

~rso!lal

oug! t to be made a matt r of

relationship, with Mr. Dulles tho.t

r~cc:-d?

No, only thet he

w~s

and crncious, willing to listen to my
wer~,

alwc y

po1r~to

courteous and consid_rate

c! vL w, whetevar they

never lost his temper. I thcug t he· as

n excellent Secretary

f State, did a good job •. I C.! ·n't eg-:... w!.th ::;om of the things he did,

...utI always ask

mys~lf \~hen

I

~ttcmpt

to c:".!. !ch:e people 1n h1qh

positiona just wh3t would I Mve done hnd I b on in their position,

- 15 -

nd aometim s even on th basis cl hindsight I do!l't know that I could
have, generally s pc king 1 done cny bC"tter.

C I:I:\LI.ENER:

You mentior.ed earlier t:1at he YHU

bit inflexible,

~a

you saw him.

}..11\NSFIELDr

YeJ.

CEALLENER:

And that

MA T£f'IELD:

That changed as he <Jrew into his jo!:> . Even though he

c~ng~d?

was prepared for it, be bad to learn a lot once he got 1n there, and bet
rocognized the tugs

~nd

the balance5 which oxi&t between the executive

and the leg1fllat1va bra.nchos oi

th~ gov~rnment.

I think he alao began

to chlnge his mind a littlo bit aboot the rest of the world . You may
roc:allit was Dulles who medc the proposal

t~t

there be en e.xohanqe

of journalists botween mainland Chino end the United Statas 1 a pro-

posal which 1s still in effect and has

nev~r

been put into

ope~Uon.

When you say "irul::::dblo" 1 could you elaborate just

e bit on that?
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Briefly. He b.nd 1-Jo r:!ind m

'l:ANSFIELD:

r.e W

ntcd to do ar.d

bOW hG W &

goi.."lq to

and he ran up agetn t difficulties her

nlll s , for example -- nd h-.

.!.t, ...ut

r,d ol"' w

!cd h!s vi

What wer 'om of th sc m

CHAUJ:l E.R.a
aqr

0

up, h knew ju t

.HJ

r

I

time went

wb~St

0:1

-- among our

o:newbat.

crs on which you dis-

d wtth him ?

MAtrs:>ItLDs
Micl:Sle

Well, tho Formoua Resolution, for one thinq , the
~st

Resolution for no•hor.

I ean•t recall

ofi-~nd,

I looked upon him o.s a

hera •ere other si uations which

but there were ot hers. Not too mzmy, b cause
gr~at

Secrot<!.ry of St te.

W 11, l t ink tb!s would '·

Okay .
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